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WHICH SCHOOL SYSTEMS SORT WEAKER 
STUDENTS INTO SMALLER CLASSES? 






We examine whether the sorting of differently achieving students into differently sized 
classes results in a regressive or compensatory pattern of class sizes for a sample of national 
school systems. Sorting effects are identified by subtracting the causal effect of class size on 
performance from their total correlation. Our empirical results indicate substantial 
compensatory sorting within and especially between schools in many countries. Only the 
United States, a country with decentralized education finance and considerable residential 
mobility, exhibits regressive between-school sorting. Between-school sorting is more 
compensatory in systems with ability tracking. Within-school sorting is more compensatory 
when administrators rather than teachers assign students to classrooms. 
JEL Classification: I28, H52, D73. 




Martin R. West 
Harvard University 
John F. Kennedy School of Government 
79 J.F.Kennedy Street, Taubman 306 












We would like to thank Claudia Buch, David Ellwood, Erich Gundlach, Eric Hanushek, 
Caroline Hoxby, Christopher Jencks, Paul Peterson, and seminar participants at Harvard and 
Kiel Universities for helpful comments. Wößmann would like to thank the Program on 
Education Policy and Governance (PEPG) at the Kennedy School of Government, Harvard 
University, for its hospitality during two visits which allowed much of this work to be 
completed. West is equally grateful for the support and hospitality provided by the Kiel 
Institute for World Economics.   1
I. Introduction 
The sorting of students into classes of different sizes may reflect a variety of motives. 
While many policies influencing class sizes are explicitly compensatory, with low-
performing students placed in smaller classes, other forces at work in many education 
systems are likely to have a regressive impact.1 Of course, the question of whether 
allocating additional class-size resources to low-performing students is an effective and 
cost-efficient strategy for improving their performance is a matter of considerable 
ongoing debate (cf. Hanushek 2003; Krueger 2003). Yet the interest parents, teachers, 
and administrators express in reducing class sizes suggests that the distributional 
outcomes of this sorting process are of interest from a political-economy perspective.2 
First, they can serve as a test of theories about the relative influence of various groups 
and individual actors in education systems with different institutional characteristics, 
and second as an imperfect but informative indicator of the extent to which these school 
systems reinforce or counterbalance existing academic and social inequities. 
The mechanisms through which students of differing abilities might be sorted in 
smaller or larger classes are countless, and stem from sources as diverse as parental 
choices about where to live and which school their child will attend, the placement of 
students into classrooms within schools, and school-level placement policies of the 
school system as a whole. Although endogeneity in the relationship between class size 
and student achievement is widely recognized as a potential source of bias in estimates 
of resource effects (cf. Card and Krueger 1996), most previous research has concerned 
itself with the placement policies responsible only insofar as they mask the true causal 
impact of class size on achievement, and thus motivate the development of experimental 
or quasi-experimental research designs (Krueger 1999; Angrist and Lavy 1999; Case 
                                                 
1    Although public finance scholars typically distinguish regressive policies from progressive 
policies, we use the term compensatory in order to emphasize that we are concerned here with the 
allocation of class-size resources with respect to achievement rather than income and to avoid the 
connotations of the term ‘progressive education’ as it is most commonly used in the field of education.  
2   Viadero (1998) reports the consistent popularity of class-size reductions with U.S. politicians, 
and a recent poll shows that reducing class size is second only to early-childhood education as a priority 
for education spending, far ahead of items such as increasing teacher pay, putting computers in the 
classroom, and school construction and modernization (Jacobson 2002).   2
and Deaton 1999; Hoxby 2000).3 As yet, the relationship between students’ academic 
ability and the relative size of their classes between and within schools has not been 
estimated, and the causes of different patterns of resource allocation remain unclear. 
In this paper, we estimate the extent to which students of different ability levels are 
sorted into differently sized classes both between and within schools in 18 education 
systems around the world.4 To account for the possibility that the size of the class to 
which a student is currently assigned may affect her academic performance, we use a 
combination of school-fixed-effects and instrumental-variables identification strategies 
to decompose the simple correlation between class size and student achievement in each 
country into three parts (Section II): (i) the effect of students being sorted into schools 
with different average class sizes (the between-school sorting effect); (ii) the effect of 
students being sorted within schools into smaller or larger classes (the within-school 
sorting effect); and (iii) the causal effect of class size on student achievement.  
We implement this identification strategy using the international database of the 
Third International Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS), which provides data rich 
enough to support the estimations for a representative sample of middle-school students 
in 18 countries (Section III). To provide unbiased estimates of both between- and 
within-school sorting effects in each of these school systems, our identification strategy 
takes advantage of unique characteristics of the TIMSS database, namely its 
information on the performance and the actual and grade-average class size of students 
in two adjacent grades within the same school on a single achievement test.  
Our empirical estimates reveal whether compensatory or regressive effects dominate 
the sorting of students into differently sized classes in our sample of school systems 
(Section IV). For the majority of countries in our sample, we find a statistically 
significant compensatory pattern of between-school sorting. The United States is the 
                                                 
3  A few studies of class-size effects have attempted to characterize in general terms the allocation 
of class-size resources in the specific contexts they examine. Akerhielm (1995) uses teachers’ subjective 
ratings of the quality of the students in their classrooms to show that in the United States, teachers of 
relatively small classes were more likely to describe their students’ abilities as below average. Similarly, 
a survey of a random sample of 500 teachers in New Jersey conducted by Boozer and Rouse (2001: 166) 
revealed an “overwhelming tendency of schools … to allocate resources in a compensatory fashion.” 
4  While many kinds of sorting are possible, for example based on social class, race, or other 
family-background features, this paper examines only sorting with respect to students’ academic abilities. 
Likewise, it restricts itself to the allocation of class size, leaving the allocation of other resources for 
future research.    3
only country that exhibits statistically significant regressive between-school sorting. We 
also find evidence of sorting at the within-school level, with the allocation being 
compensatory in some countries and regressive in others.  
In Section V, we develop hypotheses concerning the determinants of different 
patterns of resource allocation between and within schools. At the between-school level, 
we argue that the political economy of ability tracking results in compensatory resource 
allocations, while the residential choices of parents, particularly in combination with 
decentralized educational finance, further regressive resource allocations. At the within-
school level, we argue that sorting tends to be regressive where teachers control student 
placements and compensatory where administrators control the placement of students 
and teachers into classrooms and where external exams make efficiency considerations 
more salient. Using the international variation in our estimates of sorting effects in 
combination with institutional background data on the school systems included in 
TIMSS, we present evidence consistent with each of these hypotheses. 
II. Identifying Sorting Effects 
A. Definition 
We define sorting effects as the observed relationship between the academic 
achievement of students (as measured by performance on a standardized assessment) 
and the size of the class in which they are taught, exclusive of any causal effect of class 
size on achievement. The most obvious sorting effects occur when students are placed 
into specific schools and classrooms explicitly according to their prior academic 
performance. However, school systems may also sort students according to a variety of 
other characteristics, such as race, sex, disruptiveness, or socioeconomic status. To the 
extent that these characteristics are correlated with academic achievement, these 
alternative forms of sorting may play a substantial indirect role in generating the overall 
patterns presented in this paper.  
Sorting effects so defined are conceptually equivalent to omitted-variable biases in 
an estimation of the effect of class size on student performance using observational 
data. Let O be a vector of variables “omitted” from a specification that tries to estimate 
the causal effect γ of class size S on test-score performance T:    4
(1)  ε θ γ + + = O S T   . 
Estimating this equation without the omitted variables O yields a biased estimate of 
the class-size coefficient which we denote α, and the standard formula for omitted-
variable bias (cf., e.g., Greene 2000: 334) tells us that the expected value of this 
estimate is  
(2)  ( ) ( ) [ ]θ γ α O S S S E ′ ′ + =
−1   . 
Given an estimate γ  of the causal effect of class size on performance, we can 
therefore measure the bias β introduced by sorting effects as follows: 
(3)  ( ) ( ) [ ]θ γ α β O S S S E ′ ′ = − =
−1   . 
Assuming for the moment only one omitted variable, we can also write 







=   .  
That is, the larger the covariance between the omitted variable and class size and the 
larger the effect of the omitted variable on performance, the larger the sorting effect 
(everything in absolute terms). The estimate β can essentially be interpreted as the 
effect of the “omitted variable” on test-score performance insofar as it is correlated with 
class size. We generally assume below that the size of the effect of specific omitted 
variables on performance is the same across school systems, so that any variation in 
aggregate sorting effects across school systems reflects differences in the covariance 
between class size and the complete set of “omitted” variables that influence 
performance and are at the same time related to class size (relative to the variance of 
class size in each system). 
B. A Thought Experiment 
A simple hypothetical example may help to clarify this definition. Imagine two school 
systems, MUCHSORTING and LITTLESORTING, each with the same number of 
students to be placed into classes of only two sizes, 10 students and 20 students per 
class. For simplicity, assume that there is no causal effect of class size on student 
performance in either system within this range of variation. Also assume that there is 
again only one omitted variable influencing both performance and class size:   5
disruptiveness. To simplify even further, assume that there are only two types of 
students – disruptive ones and non-disruptive ones – and that there is an equal number 
of each in both systems. Assume that more disruptive students are also more likely to be 
low performers – say, disruptive students perform 100 test-score points worse than non-
disruptive students – and that administrators in both systems attempt to equalize the 
level of disruption across classrooms by placing more disruptive students in smaller 
classes. Each system is therefore characterized by a compensatory pattern of sorting, 
with low performers more likely to be taught in relatively small classes. 
The two systems differ only in the proportion of disruptive students placed into the 
smaller classes. Assume that MUCHSORTING places all its disruptive students and 
none of its non-disruptive students into smaller classes, while LITTLESORTING places 
only 60 percent of its disruptive students into smaller classes – implying that 40 percent 
of its non-disruptive students also end up in smaller classes. (Perhaps teachers of small 
classes in LITTLESORTING object to having to instruct only disruptive students, 
forcing administrators to distribute non-disruptive students more evenly.) Given these 
assumptions, the average test score will be 100 points lower in the small classes than in 
the large classes in MUCHSORTING, but only 20 points lower in LITTLESORTING. 
Estimates of sorting effects β for the two school systems would indicate that for every 1 
additional student in a class, average performance is 10 test-score points higher in 
MUCHSORTING, while it is only 2 points higher in LITTLESORTING.  
In reality, of course, the situation is more complex. There are numerous examples of 
potential “omitted variables” other than disruptiveness that influence performance and 
may also be correlated with class size. The prior performance of students affects their 
current performance, and it will be correlated with class size in systems with ability 
tracking and different class sizes in different tracks. Family income would be another 
example of such an “omitted variable” in as much as it affects both students’ 
performance and the size of the classes in which they are taught, e.g. through residential 
choices of parents combined with local school financing. Sorting effects as we define 
them reflect the joint impact of decisions made by parents, educators, policymakers, and 
anyone else who influences the placement of students into classrooms on the basis of 
any such characteristics. It is this diverse and highly decentralized nature of placement   6
decisions that makes an empirical assessment of aggregate sorting effects essential to be 
able to characterize the allocation of class-size resources in different school systems.5  
C. The Identification Strategy 
As equation (3) indicates, we can identify sorting effects by decomposing the 
correlation between class size and achievement into the causal effect of class size on 
achievement and the bias introduced by sorting. Sorting effects can be usefully divided 
into two broad categories: sorting taking place between schools with different average 
class sizes, due to factors such as residential choice or tracking by school; and sorting 
taking place within schools, for example as a result of the policies schools use to assign 
students to different classes. The identification strategy advanced here generates 
separate estimates of the sorting effects arising at each of these two levels. 
We begin with a standard least-squares (LS) regression of test scores on class size. 
Using test-score data pooled from two subjects and grades, the following education 
production function is estimated:  
(5)  icgs cgs gs icgs cgs LS icgs G M S T , 1 , 1 1 1 ε υ η δ α + + + + =   , 
where Ticgs is the test score of student i in class c at grade level g in school s, S is the 
class size, M is a subject dummy (indicating test scores in mathematics as opposed to 
science), and G is a grade level dummy (indicating test scores from eighth as opposed to 
seventh grade). Additional variables to control for student and family background 
characteristics are intentionally omitted from this initial specification so that the sorting 
of students according to these characteristics will be included in our estimates of 
aggregate sorting effects. The coefficients αLS,  δ1, and η1 are parameters to be 
estimated, υ is a class-specific component of the error term, and ε is a student-specific 
                                                 
5  Because of the largely unobservable character of various decentralized placement decisions, it 
would be hard to identify a system of two simultaneous equations, which could in principle be used as an 
alternative strategy to estimate sorting effects. In this simultaneous equations system, the first equation 
would specify performance as a function of class size (the causal class-size effect) and some identifying 
variables, while the second equation would specify class size as a function of performance (the sorting 
effect) and some identifying variables. Another alternative estimation strategy would be to simply assume 
that there is no causal class-size effect, in which case it would be possible to estimate the sorting effect by 
just regressing class size on performance. However, our results show that there are sizeable class-size 
effects in some countries, so that this alternative estimation strategy would yield substantially biased 
estimates of sorting effects. Data on performance and class size at the beginning of a school year would 
mitigate this problem, but no such data exist for a large cross-section of countries.    7
component of the error term. The following subscripts are applied throughout: i for 
student, c for class, g for grade level, and s for school.  
Although often interpreted as the causal effect of class size on student performance 
(cf. Hanushek 2003; Krueger 2003), the estimated parameter αLS also reflects the 
consequences of any sorting taking place at either the between- or the within-school 
level. Substituting the estimate αLS into equation (3), we write the decomposition of αLS 
as follows:  
(6)  W B LS β β γ α + + =   , 
where γ again represents the true causal effect of class size on student achievement, βB 
is a measure of between-school sorting, and βW is a measure of within-school sorting.  
We eliminate the effects of between-school sorting from the coefficient on class size 
estimated in equation (5) by controlling for school fixed effects (FE):  
(7)  icgs cgs gs icgs s cgs FE icgs G M D S T , 2 , 2 2 2 1 ε υ η δ λ α + + + + + =   , 
where D is a vector of school dummies. This specification essentially relates differences 
in the relative performance of students in adjacent grades in the same school to 
differences in class size between the two grades. Any systematic between-school 
variation in student performance, regardless of its source, is accordingly excluded from 
the coefficient on class size. The estimate αFE therefore includes only the causal effect 
of class size on achievement and the within-school sorting effect: 
(8)  W FE β γ α + =   . 
To disentangle the true class-size effect γ from the within-school sorting effect βW, 
we introduce into equation (7) a vector of controls for student and family-background 
characteristics C and apply an instrumental variable (IV) strategy to ensure that the 
variation in class size is exogenous to student achievement. The variable we use as an 
instrument for class size is the average class size at the respective grade level in each 
school. To be used as an instrument, a variable needs to be correlated with the 
endogenous right-hand-side variable (class size) but must be unrelated to the dependent 
variable (achievement) apart from the indirect effect resulting from its relationship with 
the endogenous right-hand-side variable. We demonstrate below that schools’ average   8
class size in each grade is in fact highly correlated with the size of the class actually 
tested in that grade. Bound by staffing rigidities and administrative rules that determine 
the number of classes in a grade on the basis of cohort size, schools generally do not 
have the flexibility needed to allocate class-size resources across grades in response to 
differences in the performance level of adjacent cohorts. Thus, differences in average 
class size between grades within a school should be unrelated to between-grade 
differences in student performance. And apart from the effect of grade-average class 
size on actual class size, there is no reason to expect average class sizes to affect the 
performance of students in a specific class. The second stage of the two-stage least-
squares (2SLS) estimation is then:  
(9)  icgs cgs gs icgs icgs s cgs IV icgs G M C D S T , 3 , 3 3 3 1 2 ˆ ε υ η δ χ λ α + + + + + + =   , 
where  $ Sc is the predicted value of the first-stage regression of actual class size Sc on the 
average class size of the grade level in the school Ac:  
(10)  icgs cgs gs icgs icgs s gs cgs G M C D A S , 4 , 4 4 4 2 3 ε υ η δ χ λ φ + + + + + + =   . 
With the average difference in performance between the two adjacent grades 
absorbed by the grade-level dummy G, the remaining difference in performance 
between the classes from the two grades is unique to each school. This idiosyncratic 
performance variation is now related to only that part of the between-grade difference in 
actual class sizes that is caused by between-grade differences in average class sizes. In 
effect, this identification strategy asks whether students in a particular grade of a school 
performed better than students in the adjacent grade at the same school (both relative to 
the national averages for their respective grades) when their classes were on average 
smaller than those of students in the adjacent grade at the same school. Arguably, this 
remaining class-size variation is a consequence of random fluctuations in the cohort size 
between two adjacent grades of a school. Given adequate control variables and 
exogenous variation in class size, the coefficient αIV estimated in equation (9) is 
uncontaminated by any sorting effects and reflects only the causal effect of class size on 
achievement (cf. Wößmann and West 2002):  
(11)  γ α = IV   .   9
Equations (6), (8), and (11) along with the estimates of αLS, αFE, and αIV enable us to 
disentangle within- and between-school sorting effects from causal class-size effects as 
follows:  
(12)  IV FE W α α β − =  
(13)  FE LS B α α β − =  
(14)  IV LS W B T α α β β β − = + ≡   . 
The estimate βT, defined as the sum of the between-school sorting effect βB and the 
within-school sorting effect βW, is an aggregate measure of the extent to which class-
size resources in a given national education system are allocated in a compensatory or 
regressive manner with respect to student achievement. 
Positive estimates of sorting effects indicate that class-size resources are allocated in 
a compensatory manner, with low-performing students placed in relatively small 
classes. The size of the estimates specifies how many fewer test-score points students 
placed in a class that is one student smaller tend to score, taking into account any causal 
effect of class size on achievement. Conversely, negative estimates indicate that 
additional class-size resources are targeted at more advanced students.  
The statistical significance of the estimates of each of these sorting effects, βB, βW, 
and βT, can be calculated using the specification test advanced by Hausman (1978) to 
compare alternative estimators of the same parameter. The null hypothesis is that the 
difference in the estimates between the two specifications is not systematic. Intuitively, 
the test assesses whether the bias affecting a parameter in a given specification – in our 
case, the bias resulting from sorting effects – is statistically significant. Given this 
approach, the statistical significance of our estimates of sorting effects for each country 
depends on the precision of the coefficients on class size estimated in equations (5), (7), 
and (9) and on the number of independent observations of class size in the data. 
III. The TIMSS Database 
The identification strategy developed above to estimate between- and within-school 
sorting effects was designed to take advantage of certain unique features of the data   10
collected as part of the Third International Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS). 
The use of school-level fixed effects is made possible by the fact that the study sample 
included more than one class from each school. Using each school’s average class size 
in each grade as an instrument imposes the additional requirement of data on 
achievement, actual class size, and grade-average class size for adjacent grades taking 
part in the same achievement test. Among large-scale international studies of student 
achievement, TIMSS is the only dataset with this particular set of characteristics. 
Conducted in 1994/95, TIMSS tested nationally representative samples of middle 
school students in each participating country. The target population was defined as all 
students enrolled in the two adjacent grades that contained the largest proportion of 13-
year-old students at the time of testing (grades seven and eight in most countries). In 
addition to testing students’ educational performance in mathematics and science, 
extensive questionnaires were administered to students, teachers, and school principals 
in order to gather background information on the students themselves and on their 
institutional environments. Datasets for the middle school years were ultimately made 
available for 39 school systems around the world.6 Schools were sampled randomly 
within each country, and as a general rule, one class per grade was selected at random 
within each sampled school. Schools serving only students with special needs were 
excluded from the target population, implying that our estimates of sorting effects will 
be unaffected by cross-country differences in the treatment of these students. Within 
sampled classes, however, all students were generally required to participate.  
Our reliance on within-school variation in performance and class size to identify 
sorting effects required that we restrict the sample to those schools in which both a 
seventh-grade and an eighth-grade class were actually tested. Furthermore, we only 
included in our analysis schools in which data on the actual class size and data on the 
grade-average class size were available for both the seventh-grade and the eighth-grade 
class. We ultimately conducted our analysis on the 18 school systems for which data 
from at least 50 schools in both mathematics and science remained after applying these 
                                                 
6   Separate datasets were collected for the French Belgian and Flemish Belgian school systems; 
both are included in the sample of school systems we examine in this paper.   11
criteria.7 Despite its reduced size, the sample of countries with which we are left 
includes systems from four different continents and with a wide range of distinctive 
institutional configurations. 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics on sample size, student performance, and class 
size for each of the countries included in our sample. The first five columns provide 
information on the number of students, classes, and schools. Each student in sampled 
classrooms was tested separately in mathematics and science. For our analysis of sorting 
effects we combine these observations into a single database. The number of 
observations (column (1)) is therefore roughly twice the number of individual students 
actually tested (column (2)).8 The number of observations of student performance in our 
sample ranges from 3,120 in Iceland to 20,209 in Japan. The number of classrooms 
sampled per country (column (3)) represents the number of independent observations of 
class size in our models, ranging from 134 in Hong Kong to 433 in Canada.  
In TIMSS, student performance in mathematics and science were measured 
separately using international achievement scores with an international mean of 500 and 
an international standard deviation of 100. The mean performance for each country 
among the students included in our sample is presented in column (5). Portugal exhibits 
the lowest average test score (446) and Singapore the highest (600).  
Data on the actual class size (column (6)) of each mathematics and science class 
come from the background questionnaires completed by each teacher, while data on the 
school-level average class size in grades seven and eight (column (7)) are from the 
school-principal background questionnaires. The minimum country-average class size 
of 20.3 students per class is found in Iceland, followed closely by the two Belgian 
school systems. With an average of 52.9 students per class, Korea has the largest classes 
by far. The other three East Asian countries in our sample also feature average class 
sizes of more than 30 students. The country averages for grade-average class size in a 
school are generally quite similar to the averages for actual class sizes. The variance in 
grade-average class sizes is somewhat smaller than the variance in actual class sizes – 
                                                 
7   This follows Wößmann and West (2002), who also report the specific reasons for the exclusion 
of the other TIMSS participants from the database. 
8   The precise number is less than half in each country due to missing data on actual class size in 



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































   12
as would be expected, since relatively small or large classes included in the sample 
should be balanced out by other classes within the same grade. 
Column (8) reports the difference in the grade-average class size between seventh 
and eighth grade in the sampled schools. There are generally no sizable differences in 
grade-average class size between seventh and eighth grade, suggesting that the rules 
governing class size are the same between seventh and eighth grade in the included 
countries. The sole exception is Singapore, where grade-average class size appears to be 
nine students larger in the eighth grade.  
A comparison of the standard deviations reported in parentheses in columns (6) to 
(8) demonstrates that the dispersion in the grade difference in class size is by and large 
comparable to the dispersion in actual class sizes in each country. The standard 
deviation in the between-grade difference in average class size ranges from 1.1 in Hong 
Kong to 6 in Spain and Singapore, with an average over the 18 countries in our sample 
of 3.5. It is less than 2 in only two countries: Hong Kong and Scotland. In these two 
countries, little variation in class size remains after having eliminated both between-
school variations and within-grade variations in individual schools, leaving us with little 
variation on which to base our instrumental-variables estimation of causal class-size 
effects. In Hong Kong, for example, the largest positive class-size difference between 
eighth- and seventh-grade classes in either mathematics or science in any school is only 
2, and the largest negative difference between eighth- and seventh-grade classes is only 
3. With these two likely exceptions, however, there seems to be enough of the specific 
variation necessary to implement our instrumental-variables identification strategy. 
While data on actual class size is taken from the teacher questionnaires, data on 
grade-average class size is collected from school principals. In column (9), coefficient 
estimates of a simple regression of actual class size on grade-average class size without 
a constant are reported for each country. The estimates are very close to 1 in all 
countries.9 This indicates that the data from the different background questionnaires are 
consistent. The estimates also confirm that the sampled classes are, on average, of the 
same size as the typical class sizes of the grades of the sampled schools; neither large 
classes nor small classes are over-represented.  
                                                 
9  Wald tests confirm that even though these coefficients are very precisely estimated, they are 
statistically indistinguishable from 1 in 11 of the 18 countries.    13
The following data on student and family-background characteristics, compiled from 
student background questionnaires, are included as control variables when estimating 
equations (9) and (10): the student’s sex, age, and country of birth, whether the student 
is living with both parents, parental education, and the number of books in the student’s 
home. The latter two are categorical variables with five categories each, so four dummy 
variables each are separately included in the regressions. Descriptive statistics on this 
data for each of the countries in our sample are presented in Appendix Table A1.10 
IV. Estimation Results 
A. Base Regression Results 
Table 2 presents the results of the three base regressions – equations (5), (7), and (9) in 
Section II – used to identify sorting effects. The dependent variable in each regression is 
the TIMSS test score, pooling mathematics and science data to perform a single set of 
regressions for each country.11 To facilitate international comparisons, we do not use 
scores that have been standardized for individual countries, but instead rely on the 
international achievement scores described in Section III. The regressions include a 
control variable indicating the subject to absorb any consistent within-country 
differences in performance level between the two subjects, as well as a control for the 
student’s grade level.12  
                                                 
10   Wößmann and West (2002: Appendix 1) compare descriptive statistics for the sample of 
students included in our study to the full sample of students tested by TIMSS for each country. Recall 
that the only students excluded were those attending schools in which students from only a single grade 
were tested, and those attending schools for which data on either actual or grade-average class size for 
one of the tested grades was missing. Apart from a few minor exceptions, the sample of students that we 
include in our study has very similar background and performance characteristics to the full sample of 
students tested in each country. 
11  When performing the analysis separately for each subject, the resulting estimates of sorting 
effects are highly correlated. Given this correlation and the fact that the determinants of sorting we 
consider below do not vary between subjects, we present only the more precise pooled results.  
12    The method used to calculate standard errors for these estimates takes into account the 
hierarchical structure of the TIMSS database. While student achievement is measured at the level of the 
individual student, class size is measured at the classroom level. Moreover, individual students in the 
same class may have various characteristics in common that are not fully captured by the included control 
variables. Regression analysis using hierarchically structured data requires the addition of a higher-level 
error term in order to avoid spurious results (Moulton 1986). Equations (5), (7), and (9) accordingly 
include a class-specific error component υcgs in addition to the student-specific error component εicgs. This 
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Column (2) reports the coefficient on class size from a weighted least-squares (LS) 
regression of achievement on class size as in equation (5).13 This coefficient reflects the 
causal effect of class size on student achievement as well as the effects of any sorting of 
students between- and within-schools into differently sized classes according to their 
performance. Eleven of the 18 LS estimates are positive in sign and statistically 
significant, indicating that students in larger classes perform better than students in 
smaller classes. In Hong Kong, where this pattern is most pronounced, students score 
5.6 additional points (or 5.6 percent of an international standard deviation) on the 
TIMSS exam for each additional student in their class. In no country in our sample is 
the coefficient on class size statistically significantly less than zero, as would be the 
case if students in smaller classes outperformed students in larger classes. 
Results of the specification that includes school fixed effects (FE) to control for any 
systematic between-school variation in student ability or the quality of education 
(equation (7)) are presented in column (4). The number of statistically significant 
positive estimates decreases to 4 from the initial total of 11 generated by the LS method, 
and there are 2 statistically significant negative estimates. The increased prevalence of 
statistically insignificant results cannot be attributed to a reduction in the precision in 
our estimates, which is modestly higher than in the LS specification. Rather, it appears 
that taking into account the effects of the sorting of students between schools yields a 
substantially different picture of the relationship between class size and student 
achievement. 
The identification strategy we use to eliminate any effects of between- and within-
school sorting combines school fixed effects with an instrumental-variables approach 
(FE-IV), as in equation (9). Also included in this specification is the full set of student-
background control variables described in Section III. Column (6) presents the estimates 
produced by this specification, which can be interpreted as unbiased estimates of the 
                                                                                                                                               
errors in the presence of hierarchically structured data (cf. Deaton 1997). It also takes account of any 
interdependence of the mathematics and science test scores of students from the same class.  
13  The regressions weight each observation by the inverse of the probability of being sampled to 
ensure that the contribution to the parameter estimates made by students from each stratum in the 
stratified TIMSS sample reflects its proportional size in the general population (Wooldridge 2001). The 
use of weighted estimators is important in the case of models in which an important predictive variable, 
e.g. innate ability in this case, is unobserved (cf. DuMouchel and Duncan 1983).    15
causal effect of class size on student achievement.14 Once again, the pattern of results 
changes considerably as within-school sorting effects are excluded from the analysis. In 
no school system does the coefficient on class size remain statistically significant in the 
counter-intuitive, positive direction after the effects of both between- and within-school 
sorting have been excluded. On the other hand, the FE-IV estimates are statistically 
significant and negative in two countries: Greece and Iceland. In these two countries, 
smaller classes have an observable beneficial effect on student performance. The effects 
are substantial in magnitude, indicating students score just over two points (or 2 percent 
of an international standard deviation of test scores) higher for every one student less in 
their class. The 16 statistically insignificant estimates are rather evenly distributed 
around zero, with nine positive and seven negative.  
B. Estimates of Sorting Effects 
Table 3 presents our estimates of between-school, within-school, and total sorting 
effects for each of the 18 countries in our sample. Estimates of the between-school 
sorting effect (βB) are reported in column (2). The standard errors for these estimates 
(column (3)), based on Hausman tests (see Section II.C), indicate that our identification 
method generates reasonably precise estimates of between-school sorting effects for 
each of the school systems we examine. Only in a single case – the Czech Republic – is 
the standard error slightly greater than 1.0, and the estimated sorting effect is 
nevertheless statistically significant at the one percent level. 
The most notable feature of these results is the prevalence of statistically significant 
estimates, which indicates that students performing at different levels are indeed sorted 
into schools with differently sized classes in the majority of the countries in our sample. 
The predominance of positive estimates suggests that most of this between-school 
sorting is compensatory in character, with lower performing students placed in smaller 
classes. We find statistically significant positive estimates of βB in 12 of our 18 
countries. Only in the United States is βB statistically significant and less than zero, 
indicating that students who perform better are typically placed in smaller classes.  
Many of the estimated between-school sorting effects are also substantial in 
magnitude. In the Czech Republic, where the estimate of the between-school sorting 
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effect is the largest, students in classes that are one student larger as a result of the 
school they attend generally score nearly four test-score points (or four percent of an 
international standard deviation of student performance) higher on the relevant TIMSS 
exam, exclusive of any causal effect of class size on performance. The statistically 
significant negative estimate of βB for the U.S., on the other hand, is quite small, 
indicating that students generally score only about 0.14 test-score points lower for each 
additional student in their class (once again excluding any causal effect of class size on 
performance). 
The estimates of within-school sorting effects (βW) reported in column (4) exhibit a 
different pattern. Fewer of these estimates achieve statistical significance, and those that 
do are more evenly divided between positive and negative results (although the majority 
is once again indicative of a compensatory pattern of resource allocation). The four 
countries with statistically significant positive estimates of βW include France, Greece, 
Iceland, and Singapore. Statistically significant negative estimates are found for French 
Belgium and the Czech Republic.  
The precision of our statistically insignificant estimates of βW varies widely (column 
(5)). It is therefore useful to distinguish those cases in which we cannot reach any useful 
conclusions on the basis of our estimates from others in which we can with a reasonable 
degree of confidence rule out the existence of substantial sorting effects. Four countries 
in particular have extremely imprecise estimates: Australia, Hong Kong, Scotland, and 
the United States. A review of the results presented in Table 2 suggests that the high 
standard errors for these school systems result from imprecision in our estimates of αIV, 
itself attributable to data insufficient to implement the demanding FE-IV estimation 
method.15 It is clear that our estimates of within-school sorting effects in these four 
cases are insufficiently precise to serve as the basis for any confident conclusions 
regarding the allocation of class-size resources. Elsewhere, however, the standard errors 
of these estimates are only modestly larger than the standard errors of our estimates of 
                                                 
15   In the cases of Hong Kong and Scotland, this imprecision reflects the lack of sufficient variation 
in the grade-average class sizes of adjacent grades in the same school, as discussed in Section III. The 
imprecision of the FE-IV estimates in Australia and the United States is due to the poor quality of the 
instrument, as demonstrated by its performance in the first-stage regression (cf. Wößmann and West 
2002).   17
between-school sorting effects. In short, our strategy for identifying within-school 
sorting effects appears to have sufficient power to identify any substantial effects.  
The results of the estimation of the joint effects of sorting at both the between- and 
within-school levels are presented in column (6) of Table 3. Each of the 7 statistically 
significant estimates of βT is positive, indicating that lower performing students are 
placed in smaller classes. Singapore exhibits the most compensatory pattern of sorting, 
with students in classes that are one student smaller scoring more than five test-score 
points higher due to aggregate sorting effects. Among the statistically insignificant 
estimates of βT, all but two are also greater than zero.16  
In summary, we find evidence of statistically significant sorting effects at either the 
between- or within-school level in 15 of the 18 countries in our sample.17 These results 
confirm that students in each of these school systems are not assigned to differently 
sized classes randomly, but rather in a way that systematically reflects their ability. 
Variations in class size are indeed as much a consequence as a cause of differences in 
achievement.  
These findings differ markedly from those of Hanushek and Luque (2002), who also 
examine the TIMSS database for evidence of non-random assignment into large and 
small classes. Using classroom-level performance data, they apply two alternative 
strategies to ensure that the results from standard LS regressions used to estimate class-
size effects are not biased by what we refer to as sorting effects. They first restrict their 
sample to schools in rural areas, which they contend are unlikely to have more than one 
class per grade. Second, they include in an analysis of the full sample an indicator 
variable identifying classes smaller than the grade-level average in the same school. 
These two strategies produce few substantial changes in either size or statistical 
significance of their estimates of class-size effects, leading them to conclude that their 
“overall results are not heavily influenced by such selection effects” (Hanushek and 
Luque 2002: 19). 
                                                 
16  In terms of precision of the βT estimate, which also relies on results of the FE-IV specification, 
the same conclusion applies as for the βW estimate.  
17    The three countries without statistically significant sorting effects are Canada, Korea, and 
Scotland, although our estimates of βW for the Scottish school system are too imprecise for us to reach 
any firm conclusions regarding within-school sorting.   18
Their approach suffers from several potential flaws. In the absence of information on 
total school size, the fact that a school is located in a rural area is likely to be a poor 
indicator of whether or not it has multiple classes per grade, while a variable indicating 
simply that a class is smaller than average fails to differentiate among classes according 
to how much smaller they are than normal. Perhaps most importantly, neither of the 
strategies implemented by Hanushek and Luque (2002) addresses the possibility of the 
sorting of students between schools. In contrast, by considering sorting occurring at 
both the between- and within-school levels, we find evidence of between-school sorting 
effects in 13 of the 18 countries in our sample. 
The relative importance of between-school sorting effects for the allocation of class-
size resources is apparent in Figure 1, which displays the distribution of our estimates of 
βB, βW, and βT into categories according to sign and statistical significance. The lower 
prevalence of within-school sorting may reflect the fact that many schools have only 
one class in each subject per grade, precluding the sorting of student into different 
classes. Figure 1 also draws attention to the fact that sorting effects in most of the 
school systems we examine tend to be compensatory, resulting in low-performing 
students being placed in smaller classes. However, exceptions with regressive sorting 
effects are found at both the between- and within-school levels, and the magnitude of 
both compensatory and regressive sorting effects varies considerably. In what follows, 
we discuss institutional characteristics of the school systems that may be responsible for 
these divergent patterns. 
V. Determinants of Sorting 
A. How Class-Size Resources Are Allocated: Towards a Theory of Student Sorting 
The sorting effects estimated above reflect the aggregate impact of decisions made by a 
diverse set of actors, including parents, teachers, administrators, and central 
policymakers. Understanding the potential determinants of between- and within-school 
sorting effects requires that we narrow our focus to those stakeholders most likely to be 
able to influence the allocation of class-size resources at specific points. We postulate 
two kinds of actors as particularly important for sorting occurring at each of the two 
levels, depicted in Table 4.   
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a  Number of systems showing a statistically significant positive (black), a statistically 
insignificant positive (white), a statistically insignificant negative (light gray), and a 
statistically significant negative (dark gray) estimate, respectively. — See text for details 








Table 4: Hypotheses on Main Determinants of Sorting 
   Regressive  Compensatory 
Between-school sorting  Parental residential choice  
(combined with local finance) 
Policymakers influenced by the  
political economy of tracking 
Within-school sorting  Teachers govern  
student placement 
Administrators govern student 
placement (especially when held 
accountable for efficiency and equity)
   19
Between-school sorting effects reflect decisions regarding which schools students 
attend and the resources available to them, decisions which should be made primarily 
by parents and central policymakers. In an education system with decentralized finance, 
Tiebout (1956) choice allows parents who demand more education to live in districts 
with a higher implicit school tax rate and thus more resources and the potential for 
smaller classes. Moreover, if the level of resources available in local schools is 
positively correlated with the price of housing, the children of wealthy parents, who will 
tend to be high performers due to their families’ backing, will also have access to 
superior resources. Provided the education system allows parents to “purchase” 
additional resources for their children by engaging in sorting at the between-school 
level (i.e. resources are not fully equalized across districts and schools), we would thus 
expect that sorting effects resulting from parental residential choices will be 
regressive.18 
The influence of policymakers on between-school sorting effects is likely to reflect 
political considerations. Given popular norms concerning equal educational 
opportunity, these considerations may be expected to lead them to allocate more 
resources to schools with disadvantaged students. Political pressure on policymakers 
should be particularly acute in systems that place students into distinct types of schools 
according to their ability, as parents and other advocates of the interests of poor 
performers are unlikely to consent to a tracked system unless students placed in the 
tracks for lower performers are compensated with tangible additional resources. 
Provided that such advocates have at least some influence on resource allocation, a 
simple political economy model of tracking suggests that tracked systems which assign 
students to schools according to their ability will tend to allocate class-size resources in 
a more compensatory manner. 
Whereas between-school sorting effects are likely to be controlled by parents and 
central policymakers, patterns of within-school sorting should be determined primarily 
by the teachers and administrators of individual schools.19 These two sets of actors have 
                                                 
18   It might also be the case that parents of struggling students select school districts or individual 
schools with small classes to provide their children with extra attention, a consideration we assume here 
is of secondary importance. 
19  To some extent, parents and policymakers may certainly exert an indirect impact on within-
school sorting by influencing the actors with direct control over placements within schools.    20
divergent interests. The process of assigning students to classrooms has a direct 
influence on the conditions under which individual teachers will perform their job, 
giving them a clear personal stake in its outcome. All else equal, most would 
presumably prefer to teach gifted students in small classes, particularly if they feel that 
their own performance will be evaluated on the basis of that of their students. To see 
how this might affect patterns of within-school sorting, assume that a certain individual 
teachers – e.g. the most senior one – is allowed to govern the placement of students in 
classes and assign teachers to classrooms. He will then choose to place the best students 
into small classes and to teach these classes himself, leaving more junior teachers to 
deal with relatively large classes of relatively poor performers. If decision-making 
power rests with teachers collectively rather than with a single teacher, a similar pattern 
of regressive within-school sorting will emerge as long as some teachers exert more 
power in the collective decision-making process than do others.  
Unlike teachers, the administrators of individual schools do not have a personal 
interest in teaching conditions in specific classrooms. Insofar as they are subject to 
political pressures in their within-school placements, these should lead them to engage 
in compensatory sorting as with policymakers in the between-school case. Additionally, 
assuming that school principals have limited resources and are evaluated on the basis of 
the overall performance of the student body as a whole, they will also be motivated to 
place students in classrooms in the manner most efficient for increasing overall student 
achievement. In practice, principals may transfer these incentives onto subordinate 
administrators, such as department heads who should possess more accurate information 
regarding the abilities of students and teachers in the specific domain under their 
control. There is scant empirical evidence available on efficiency in the assignment of 
students to small and large classes. However, Lazear (2001) argues that classroom 
teaching is a public good with congestion effects, so that it is optimal to place disruptive 
students in relatively small classes and well-behaved students in larger classes. 
Assuming disruptive students are also more likely to be low achievers, an efficient 
school would be characterized by compensatory within-school sorting effects. The 
incentives for principals to pursue efficient placement policies should be accentuated in 
education systems in which they are held accountable for student performance by a 
strong system of external exams (Bishop 1997). External exams also serve to draw   21
attention to the performance of low-performers, and may therefore lead to more 
compensatory placement policies independent of broader concerns for efficiency.  
This brief discussion suggests several testable hypotheses regarding the likely 
determinants of sorting effects, which are summarized in Table 4. While extensive 
parental choice among schools and decentralized school finance should result in 
regressive between-school sorting effects, tracking policies may lead to more 
compensatory patterns. Meanwhile, within-school sorting should be more regressive 
where subgroups of teachers can influence the assignment of students and teachers to 
classrooms, and more compensatory where school administrators control this process. 
Finally, within-school sorting should be more compensatory where external exams hold 
schools accountable for student performance. 
B. Evidence on the Determinants of Between-School Sorting 
We test these theoretical hypotheses on the determinants of between- and within-school 
sorting by regressing our estimates of sorting effects on proxies for the various 
characteristics of school systems our theory suggests should be important. Based on 
only a few observations and relatively weak proxies, our empirical analysis of the 
determinants of sorting effects is necessarily speculative. Nevertheless, the results are 
informative. 
As our dependent variable in this analysis is estimated rather than observed, the error 
term from an ordinary least squares regression is heteroskedastic with mean zero and 
variance equal to the sum of the variance of the actual error term and the variance of the 
estimated sorting effect. We account for this heteroskedasticity with the weighted 
estimation strategy advanced by Anderson (1993; cf. Slaughter 2001): First, we regress 
the estimated sorting effect on the relevant explanatory variable(s) using ordinary least 
squares. We then regress the squared residuals from this first regression on the variance 
of the estimated sorting effect and this variance squared and cubed. Finally, we generate 
the predicted values from the latter regression. These predicted values indicate the 
extent to which the original residuals can be explained by the variance of the sorting 
effects. The inverses of these predicted values are then used as the weights in a 
weighted least squares estimation of the initial model, thereby assigning less weight to 
those observations that are relatively imprecisely estimated.   22
Table 5 presents the results of regressions of our estimate of the between-school 
sorting effect βB on a series of variables compiled from the TIMSS background 
questionnaires administered to the principal of each school and from supplementary 
sources.20 We use two proxies for ability tracking: the percentage of TIMSS schools in 
each school system reporting that they use academic performance as a criteria for 
admission (performance-based admissions) and a dummy variable indicating whether 
students are placed in different tracks prior to the completion of secondary education 
(tracking). We constructed the latter variable on the basis of information contained in 
the International Encyclopedia of National Systems of Education (Postlethwaite 1996). 
The impact of parental choices on between-school sorting effects depends on two 
factors: families’ ability to move between schools on the basis of class size and 
decentralized responsibility for education funding. Our proxy for mobility among the 
population with school-aged children is the mean percentage of current students in the 
schools sampled by TIMSS that transferred into the school after the start of the 
academic year (transfer rate).21 As a measure of fiscal decentralization, we take the 
percentage of final funds for primary and secondary education in 1995 allocated by 
local (as opposed to regional or central) governments (local finance; OECD 1998: 137, 
Table B6.1a). Descriptive statistics for each of these variables are presented in 
Appendix Table A2.  
Columns (1) to (4) of Table 5 present the simple bivariate relationships between 
these four variables and our estimates of βB. A positive coefficient indicates that the 
variable is associated with a more compensatory pattern of resource allocation, while a 
negative estimate suggests the relevant variable is associated with more regressive 
sorting. Both measures of tracking are in fact associated with compensatory between-
school sorting effects. A high level of student mobility between schools is weakly 
associated with more regressive between-school sorting effects, as is the percentage of 
funds for education allocated by local governments. 
                                                 
20   The value assigned to each country for the TIMSS variables represents the simple mean of the 
figures reported separately in the data almanacs for the seventh- and eighth-grade samples.  
21  Using the mean percentage of students of current students in the schools sampled by TIMSS that 
did not finish the academic year in the same school as an alternative proxy for mobility produces 

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































   23
Each of these relationships becomes stronger in the multivariate specifications 
reported in columns (5) to (7).22 Although the small number of observations urges 
extreme caution in generalizing these results, the basic patterns among the countries 
with available data are clear. The use of academic admissions criteria by a large number 
of schools could in principle be used to foster any pattern of resource allocation. Its 
strong association with more compensatory sorting effects across specifications 
therefore serves to validate our hypothesis that political constraints ensure that highly 
selective education systems are characterized by compensatory patterns of resource 
allocation. 
While our empirical results indicate that higher levels of student mobility and fiscal 
decentralization are independently associated with sorting effects, it is actually the 
combination of these two factors that we suggest is necessary for parental choices to 
lead to regressive between-school sorting. Data on both is available for only six of the 
countries in our sample. Nevertheless, the interaction term between transfer rate and 
local finance included in the column (7) specification is in fact statistically significantly 
associated with regressive sorting between schools.23 
The explanatory power of this interaction term reflects the fact that it essentially 
functions as an indicator variable for the United States, the only country in our sample 
for which we find statistically significant evidence of regressive between-school 
sorting. The United States is of course a country with high residential mobility and a 
system of education finance dominated by local property taxes. The combination of 
these two factors appears to allow families with high-performing students to live in 
school districts with relatively small classes. Programs intended to allocate additional 
resources to districts with a large percentage of students living in poverty are apparently 
insufficient to compensate fully for the decentralized decisions of parents regarding the 
schools their children will attend. This same logic may also explain the absence of 
compensatory between-school sorting effects in Canada, the country whose institutional 
                                                 
22  Qualitatively the same multivariate results emerge when using tracking rather than performance-
based admissions as our proxy for tracked systems, although the statistical significance of the results is 
generally lower. This may reflect the fact that the former is a dichotomous variable, while the latter is 
continuous.  
23  Due to the small number of degrees of freedom, we did not include the main effects of transfer 
rate and local finance in this specification.    24
arrangements for financing education most closely parallel those of the United States 
(cf. Hoxby 2003).24 
C. Evidence on the Determinants of Within-School Sorting 
Table 6 presents our analysis of the determinants of within-school sorting patterns, 
using our estimates of within-school sorting effects βW. The TIMSS school background 
questionnaires included a battery of questions concerning who exercised primary 
responsibility for assigning students and teachers to classrooms. We use the percentage 
of schools reporting that teachers are responsible for placing students as a proxy for the 
ability of certain teachers to pursue their interests in within-school sorting. Conversely, 
department heads are likely to share their administrative superiors’ joint goal of 
compensatory and efficient placements, and their greater familiarity with the students 
and teachers under their control may actually make them most effective in pursuing that 
goal. The percentages of schools in which department heads have primary responsibility 
for placing students and for assigning teachers in classes are therefore used as proxies 
for the dominance of compensatory considerations.25  
Columns (1) to (3) present the bivariate regressions of within-school sorting effects 
βW on these proxies for within-school placement responsibilities. Although one of the 
observed relationships falls (marginally) short of conventional levels of statistical 
significance, each is in the expected direction. Greater teacher influence on student 
placements is associated with more regressive within-school sorting effects, while 
control by department heads is associated with more compensatory patterns. These 
relationships remain on the fringes of statistical significance when the proxies for 
responsibility of teachers and department heads are entered jointly in the multivariate 
specifications reported in columns (4) and (5). However, all continue to be in the 
expected direction.  
Finally, column (6) presents the relationship between βW and the percentage of 
principals reporting that external exams have a large influence on the curriculum in 
their schools, which we use as a proxy for the influence of external exams in general. 
Although this question was only asked in 15 countries, the variable has the statistically 
                                                 
24  The estimate of βB for Canada is extremely precise but statistically indistinguishable from zero. 
25  Descriptive statistics for these variables are also presented in Appendix Table A2.   
Table 6: Determinants of Within-School Sorting Effects  
Least-squares regressions. – Standard errors in parentheses. – Dependent variable: Within-school sorting effect (βw – see Table 3). –  
All observations are weighted to account for estimated dependent variable. – See text for specification details. 
    (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)     (5)      (6)  
Teachers place students  -0.053°             -0.053° -0.030         
   (0.033)              (0.033)  (0.030)         
Department heads place students      0.040
†     0.035
†      
       (0.018)      (0.018)         
Department heads assign teachers          0.115
†     0.101 
†    
              (0.039)        (0.041)         
External exams                     0.051
† 
                               (0.022)  
Constant 1.348
‡ -0.275 -0.290  0.722 0.338    -0.62 
   (0.708)  (0.502)   (0.405)   (0.793)  (0.748)    (0.422)  
Observations  17  17   17   17  17    15  
F  2.7 4.8  8.6  3.94 4.9    5.6 
Probability > F  (0.124)  (0.044)   (0.010)   (0.044)  (0.025)    (0.034)  
R
2  0.151 0.243  0.365  0.360 0.410    0.302 
Adjusted R
2  0.094  0.193   0.323   0.269  0.326    0.248  
Significance levels: 
* 1 percent. — 
† 5 percent. — 
‡ 10 percent. — ° 15 percent. 
   25
significant association with more compensatory placement policies our theoretical 
hypothesis suggested.26  
VI. Conclusions 
Do countries place less skilled students in classes smaller than those of their more 
skilled counterparts? While the relative incidence of compensatory sorting effects 
among our 18 sample countries implies they do, exceptions confirm that the internal 
allocation of class-size resources between low- and high-performing students defies 
easy generalization. Nevertheless, our analysis of sorting effects and their potential 
determinants suggest several broad conclusions.  
First of all, the prevalence of sorting effects across a diverse sample of countries – a 
finding that contrasts with previous research using international data (cf. Hanushek and 
Luque 2002) – has important implications for estimating the causal effects of 
educational resources on student achievement. To the extent that school systems are 
compensatory in their allocation of particular resources, conventional estimates of 
resource effects will be biased against finding that those resources increase student 
achievement. Yet international variation in the direction and magnitude of sorting 
effects indicates that this bias must be assessed individually for specific school systems. 
Progress in the estimation of resource effects in international education production 
functions will therefore depend on the development and application of identification 
strategies designed to address the problem of resource endogeneity independently in 
each school system examined. Furthermore, such strategies need to be robust enough to 
take into account the possibility of endogeneity resulting from non-random placements 
both at the between- and the within-school levels.  
The relationship between the specific sorting effects estimated in this paper and 
educational equity broadly conceived is not straightforward. The necessity of this 
qualification is underscored by the fact that a statistically significant causal effect of 
class size on achievement is found for only 2 of the 18 countries of our sample, while 
                                                 
26  An interaction term between external exams and each of the variables on responsibility for 
placing students and teachers enters the specifications of columns (1) to (4) with a positive coefficient in 
each case. Although the estimates on the interaction terms never reach statistical significance at 
conventional levels, the direction of these relationships is consistent with the claim that central exams 
induce more compensatory placement policies.    26
the possibility of a substantial causal class-size effect can be rejected in 11 countries (cf. 
Wößmann and West 2002). In view of this finding, it is important to know whether the 
allocation of other educational resources accords with the findings reported here. Do 
low-performing students in countries with compensatory sorting effects also receive a 
disproportionate share of other resources, or is class size instead used to compensate for 
other inequities? Given budget constraints, investments in teacher quantity of the type 
necessary to reduce class size for low-achieving students might themselves serve to 
lower the quality of these students’ teachers. If the quality of teachers represents the 
more important input in educational production (cf. Hanushek et al. 1998; Tamura 
2001), compensatory class-size policies may even serve to decrease educational 
opportunities for low-performers.  
Our analysis of the potential determinants of sorting effects enhances our 
understanding of the allocation of educational resources in the political economy of 
education, offering a solid foundation for future research in this area. Both our theory 
and our evidence suggest that aggregate patterns of sorting at the between-school level 
reflect the decisions of parents and central policymakers. While fiscal decentralization 
and the ability to move between schools allow wealthy parents to purchase additional 
resources for high-performing students, political considerations lead policymakers in 
selective systems with multiple tracks to direct additional class-size resources towards 
schools with low-performing students. By contrast, our model of within-school sorting 
emphasizes the role played by actors within specific schools. While individual teachers 
have an interest in regressive placement policies (provided they are permitted to teach 
the smaller classes), efficiency concerns may lead principals and other administrators to 
implement compensatory within-school placements schemes – especially in systems in 
which they are held accountable for student performance by external exams. All these 
hypotheses are consistent with our empirical evidence.  
More generally, our findings regarding the determinants of sorting effects cast doubt 
on the empirical relevance of models of education production that treat schools as 
unitary actors maximizing educational productivity, thus ignoring both the institutional 
context in which they are situated and the interests of the individuals working within 
them. Lazear (2001), for example, assumes that schools always attempt to maximize 
educational productivity, and thereby pursue an optimal allocation of students to   27
classrooms. While his model’s implication that it would be optimal  to sort more 
disruptive students into smaller classes may well hold, the interests of some teachers 
may run in a different direction. Where teachers or other parties with personal interests 
at stake are allowed to influence student placements, educational considerations may 
not be paramount and school systems may not operate optimally.  
   28
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Table A2: Descriptive Statistics: Institutional Background Data
 
Country-level data. See text for variable definitions and information on sources. 
  (1) (2) (3) 
 Observations  Mean  Standard  Deviation 
Performance-based admissions  10 8.56  (6.66) 
Tracking  18 0.72  (0.46) 
Transfer rate  18 2.84  (2.56) 
Local finance  11 30.27  (38.92) 
Teachers place students  17 17.80  (12.51) 
Department heads place students  17 17.04  (25.52) 
Department heads assign teachers  17 7.71  (13.82) 
External exams  15 17.04 (24.83) 
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